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NRDC v. EPA: THE FINAL CHAPTER IN THE LISTING SAGA
I.

INTRODUCTION

The disposal of used oil has become a controversial issue and
has been the source of one of the United States Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA's") regulatory problems for over a decade.
EPA estimated in 1992 that there are over 1.3 billion gallons of used
and waste oil generated annually by the United States.' In 1988, in
which "1.35 billion gallons of used lubricating oil [were] generated
in the United States, approximately 480 million gallons were disposed into the environment." 2 At least 180 million gallons of this
3
total was a result of crankcase oil discarded by individuals.
These statistics underscore the significance of the issue of
whether or not "used oil"4 should be listed as a hazardous waste and
1. Kathryn Dabrowski Russiello, To List or Not to List Recycled Used Oil as a RCRA
Hazardous Waste: The Saga Continues, 2 U. BALT.J. ENVrL. L. 170, 170 (1992). See also
Used Oil Recycling: Joint Hearing on H.R. 7833 and S. 2412 Before the Subcomm. on
Energy and Powerand the Subcomm. on Transportationand Commerce of the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1980) [hereinafter Used
Oil Hearing] (statement of Gary N. Deitrich, Associate Deputy Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste, EPA).
This massive amount of oil is comprised of both used automobile crankcase
oil and used industrial oils. Used Oil Hearing,supra, at 24. After use, EPA estimated
that only 100,000,000 gallons are re-refined or reclaimed, while 400,000,000 gallons are disposed of either indiscriminately or with garbage and trash. Id.
2. Elizabeth A. Beiring, Used Oil in the United States: EnvironmentalImpact, Regulation, and Management, 41 BuFF. L. REv. 157, 157-58 n.5 (1988) (citing Philip H.
Voorhees, Generation and Flow of Used Oil in the United States in 1988, Presentation
Prepared for EPA and Presented at the Association of Petroleum Rerefineries/
Project Rose Conference app., 2d attachment (Nov. 30, 1989)). See also Russiello,
supra note 1, at 170.
3. Beiring, supra note 2, at 157-58 n.5. See also PaulaJ. Meske, Comment, The
Solid Waste Dilemma: Municipal Liability and Household Hazardous Waste Managemen
23 ENVTL. L. 355, 370 (1993) (stating that while 17% of used oil generated in the
United States comes from households, only 10% of this amount is recycled).
4. See Thomas R. Kline et al., Energy Resources Law: Update on Environmental and
Health and Safety Regulatory Issues, 28 TORT & INs. L.J. 211, 216 (1993) (quoting 40
C.FR. §§ 260.10, 279.1 (1990) (EPA defines "used oil" as "any oil that has been
refined from crude oil, or any synthetic oil, that has been used and as a result of
such use is contaminated by physical or chemical impurities"). See also Beiring,
supra note 2, at 160 (quoting Used Oil Recycling Act of 1980 § 3, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(36) (1988) (setting forth the definition stated by Congress for used oil as
"any oil which has been (A) refined from crude oil, (B) used, and (C) as a result of
such use, contaminated by physical or chemical impurities"); Paul J. Dickman,
Leaking Underground Storage Tanks: The Scope ofRegulatory Burdens and PotentialRemedies Under RCRA and CERCLA, 21 N. Ky. L. REv. 619, 624 (1994) (defining "used
oil" as a " 'catch all' medium for spent deaning solvents and degreasing
chemicals").

(377)
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thus required to be disposed of pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA").5 This long-standing issue has captured the attention of Congress, EPA, oil recyclers, the Hazardous
Waste Treatment Council ("HWTC") and other interest groups, all
6
of whom have critical interests in the decision.
RCRA established a "cradle-to-grave" regulatory structure to
monitor the safe treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous
-waste. 7 Under RCRA, EPA has been granted broad powers through
which to regulate the treatment and disposal of hazardous wastes."
As part of its duties, EPA is required to evaluate substances in order
to determine if they should be listed. 9 Once a substance is listed,

5. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA") §§ 3001-5006,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-56 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993). See alsoJohn C. Yang, Standing... In
The Doorway ofJustice, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1356, 1368-69 n.91 (1991) (describing
RCRA as an example of the "complex and ever-changing nature of environmental
statutes"). See generallyRobert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the FederalLands IlL. Regulation of Solid and Hazardous Waste Management, 13 STAN. ENVTrL. Lj.3,26-27 (1994).
6. James H. Hoeksema, Clean the Air, 22 ENVrL. L. 1579, 1579 (1992) (this
editorial was authored by the Assistant General Counsel of The National Oil Recyclers Association). The oil industry sought to prevent used oil from being listed,
reasoning that listing discourages used oil from being recycled. Id. See also Kyle
Dudley Roberts, Comment, Texas Responds to the Used Oil Problem:The Used Oil Collection, Management, and Recycling Act, 45 Sw. LJ. 1247, 1254 (1991) (citing Current
Developments, 22 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 488, 489 (June 21, 1991)). On the other side
of the spectrum, proponents for listing rely on the example set by California,
whose decision to list used oil resulted in recycling 50% more than states who have
chosen not to list used oil as hazardous. Id. But see Meske, supra note 3, at 370 n.88
(quoting 22 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 488 (June 21, 1991)).
7. United Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See
generally RCRA § 1004, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). RCRA defines a "hazardous waste" as:
a solid waste ... which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical,
chemical, or infectious characteristic may(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or
an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health
or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or
disposed of, or otherwise managed.
Id.
8. Yang, supranote 5, at 1369 (discussing authority of EPA Administrator and
wide latitude given to EPA in defining and listing hazardous wastes).
9. American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1990), rev'd
sub. nom. Steel Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 27 F.3d 642 (1994). For further discussion of
EPA's framework used in determining listing of a hazardous waste, see infra notes
14-26 and accompanying text.
By 1990, over 100 hazardous substances and over 700 hazardous chemical
compounds were listed. Yang, supra note 5, at 1368-69 n.91 (citing 40 C.F.R.
§§ 261.30-.33 (1990)).
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strict regulatory conditions are to be promulgated for the handling
and disposing of the substance.' 0
Recently, EPA exercised its discretion in an attempt to "end"
the controversy surrounding used oil by deciding not to list used oil
as a hazardous waste. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit upheld this decision in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency." The court found the decision by EPA to be within the
agency's broad, congressionally-delegated discretion for making
2
listing determinations.'
This Note will first trace the development of EPA's decision
not to list used oil as a hazardous waste. Second, it will give an overview of the criteria used and how EPA reached its decision. Then,
this Note will scrutinize how the court interpreted Congress' statutory grant of power to EPA. This Note will conclude by exploring
the potential impact of this decision on the environment, the treatment of used oil and future interpretations of RCRA.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Statutory Background

RCRA was designed to establish a framework for the federal
3
government's program of solid and hazardous waste regulation.'
Congress, through RCRA, "delegat[ed] to EPA the task of promulgating regulations identifying the characteristics of hazardous waste
and listing specific wastes as hazardous."' 4 Under RCRA, there are
two ways in which a substance will be deemed a hazardous waste. A
substance may be either a listed or a characteristic hazardous
10. American Petroleum, 906 F.2d at 733. After a substance has been identified
or listed as a hazardous waste, EPA must then concern itself with the management
procedures for that substance. Id. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.

11. 25 F.3d 1063, 1073 (1994). The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
found that EPA's decision not to list was consistent with congressional intent. Id. at
1070. The court further asserted that to hold otherwise would "reduce the regulatory scheme to a mere 'steppingstone' in the listing process." Id.

12. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1074. For further discussion of the court's holding in
NRDC, see infra notes 93-115 and accompanying text.

13. See Glicksman, supra note 5, at 26-27 (discussing the statutory structure
and purpose of RCRA); Jeffrey S. Hannapel, Energy Resources Law: Update on Environmental and Health and Safety Regulatory Issues, 28 TORT & INS. Lj. 211, 215-16
(1993) (examining EPA's obligations imposed by RCRA).
14. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1065 (citing RCRA § 3001, 42 U.S.C. § 6921). Under
RCRA, EPA is responsible for identifying hazardous wastes, monitoring their use
and promulgating regulations for their disposal. Yang, supranote 5, at 1369 (citing
RCRA § 3001, 3002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921 (a)-(b), 6922(a), 6923(a), 6924(d)(2)).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995

3

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 5
380

VIIANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VI: p. 377

waste. 15 To determine whether a substance should be a listed hazardous waste, EPA initially compiles lists identifying substances considered to be "potentially hazardous substances." 16 EPA then
applies technical criteria with which it evaluates the substances and
then decides whether or not to list the substance as "hazardous."' 7
Once a substance is identified and listed as a hazardous waste,
RCRA requires EPA to promulgate regulations which establish standards for "recordkeeping, labelling, appropriate containment and
15. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.10-.11 (1990).
16. NIRDC, 25 F.Sd at 1065 (referring to 40 C.F.R. § 261, subpart D (1990)).
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
17. Id. at 1065-66. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.11 (1990), which provides, in relevant
part:
The Administrator shall list a solid waste as a hazardous waste only upon
determining that the solid waste meets one of the following criteria:
(1) It exhibits any of the characteristics of hazardous waste identified in subpart C....
(3) It contains any of the toxic constituents listed in appendix VIII
and, after considering [a set of eleven] factors, the Administrator condudes that the waste is capable of posing a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly
treated, stored, transported or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
Id.
The eleven criteria referred to by § 261.11(a) (3) consist of:
(i) The nature of the toxicity presented by the constituent.
(ii) The concentration of the constituent in the waste.
(iii) The potential of the constituent or any toxic degradation product of
the constituent to migrate from the waste into the environment under
the types of improper management considered in paragraph (a) (3) (vii)
of this section.
(iv) The persistence of the constituent or any toxic degradation product
of the constituent.
(v) The potential for the constituent or any toxic degradation product of
the constituent to degrade into non-harmful constituents and the rate of
degradation.
(vi) The degree to which the constituent or any degradation product of
the constituent bioaccumulates in ecosystems.
(vii) The plausible types of improper management to which the waste
could be subjected.
(viii) The quantities of the waste generated at individual generation sites
or on a regional or national basis.
(ix) The nature and severity of the human health and environmental
damage that has occurred as a result of the improper management of
wastes containing the constituent.
(x) Action taken by other governmental agencies or regulatory programs
based on the health or environmental hazard posed by the waste or waste
constituent.
(xi) Such other factors as may be appropriate.
40 C.F.RL § 261.11(a) (3) (i)-(xi) (1990).
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use of a manifest system that would insure all wastes are treated,
stored or disposed of in licensed facilities." 18
A substance may also be deemed a RGRA hazardous waste
based on the characteristics of ignitability 9 , corrosivity2° , reactivity 2 ' and toxicity.22 In such instances, a substance is labelled a

"characteristic hazardous waste." In contrast to a listed hazardous
waste, EPA action is not required for a substance to become a char18. RCRA § 3002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922 (a) (1)-6924(a) (5). See also Yang, supra

note 5, at 1369-70 (once implemented, these regulations are to be reviewed periodically). Once a substance is described and listed as a hazardous waste, EPA also
assigns the substance a waste code. American Petroleum, 906 F.2d at 733. See also
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 270, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
[hereinafter HWTC] (describing the process EPA is required to follow as mandated under RCRA).
19. 40 C.F.R. § 261.21 (1990). A substance displays the characteristic of
"ignitability" when it shows any of the following:
(1) It is a liquid... containing less than 24 percent alcohol by volume

(2) It is not a liquid and is capable ... of causing fire through friction...
or spontaneous chemical changes and, when ignited, bums so vigorously
and persistently that it creates a hazard.
(3) It is an ignitable compressed gas as defined in 49 CFR 173.300...
(4) It is an oxidizer as defined in 49 CFR 173.151.
Id.
20. 40 C.F.R. § 261.22 (1990). A waste satisfies the standard for corrosivity
when it meets either of the following descriptions:
(1) It is aqueous and has a pH of less than or equal to 2 or greater than
or equal to 12.5 ...
(2) It is a liquid and corrodes steel ... at a rate greater than 6.35 mm ...
per year....
Id.
21. 40 C.F.R. § 261.23 (1990). A waste displays characteristics of reactivity
when any of the following exist:
(1) It is normally unstable and readily undergoes violent change without
detonating.
(2) It reacts violently with water.
(3) It forms potentially explosive mixtures with water.
(4) When mixed with water, it generates toxic gases, vapors or fumes in a
quantity sufficient to present a danger to human health or the

environment.
(5) It is a cynanid or sulfide bearing waste which ... can generate toxic
gases, vapors or fumes ...
(6) It is capable of detonation or explosive reaction if it subjected to a
strong initiating source or if heated under confinement.
(7) It is readily capable of detonation or explosive decomposition or reaction at a standard temperature and pressure.
(8) It is a forbidden explosive as defined in 49 CFR 173.51....
Id.
22. 40 C.F.R. § 261.24 (1990). A substance satisfies the standard for toxicity
when it contains any of the listed contaminants in concentrations equal to or

greater than those listed in the same table Id. For further detail of the specific
contaminants and the requisite levels to be classified within characteristics of toxicity, see 40 C.F.R. § 261.24, Table 1 (1990).
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
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acteristic hazardous waste under RCRA initially.23 Under the statute as passed in 1976, if "any solid waste exhibit[ed] one or more of
these characteristics [it was] automatically deemed a 'hazardous
waste.' 24 It must be noted, however, that EPA subsequently
changed this language so there is no longer a presumption of hazardousness. 2 5 Thus, a waste will be classified as a RCRA hazardous
waste if it contains a hazardous characteristic and if the Administrator determines that the substance will pose a threat to human
26
health and the environment.
Because EPA failed to timely promulgate stringent regulations,
in 1984 Congress enacted the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments ("HSWA").27 HSWA amended RCRA by mandating specific
strict deadlines within which EPA was to resolve the used oil issue.2 8
23. See infra note 24.
24. Yang, supra note 5, at 1369 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 261.20-.24 (1990)). Any
substance which is deemed a characteristic hazardous waste under the second
method, even if not listed as one by EPA, falls under the regulation of RCRA Subtitle C. See Dickman, supra note 4, at 627 n.45 (describes 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.21-.24
(1993) as "[p]roviding analytical procedures for determining the concentrations
of various chemicals in waste products and sets [sic] limits for these concentrations, above which wastes are classified as characteristically hazardous."). Dickman
further notes that "specific characteristics of a material, such as corrosivity,
ignitability, or reactivity, can render it a characteristically hazardous waste under
these sections." Id. See also American Petroleum,906 F.2d at 733. But see 1 JOHN-MARK
STENSVAAG, HAZARDOUS WASTE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.9A, at I & n.48 (Treatise
Cumulative Supplement 1993) ("A waste must be listed if it meets any of the [40
C.F.R. § 261.11] criteria") (quoting D. STEVER, LAw OF CHEMICAL REGULATION AND
HAZARDoUS WASTE § 5.02(2) (b) (1986)).
25. See infra note 26.
26. Alex S. Karlin, LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE CouRsE HANDBOOK SERIES, PUB. No. H4-5139, 1991-1992 LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS: RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND REcovERY ACT 445 (1992).

Previously, any substance which exhibited one of the four characteristics was
automatically "deemed a hazardous waste." American Petroleum, 906 F.2d at 733.
Once determined to be hazardous, even if not formally listed, the substance would
be regulated under Subtitle C of RCRA. Id. See HWTC, 861 F.2d at 271. But see
David M. Flannery & Robert E. Lannan, Hazardous Waste-The Oil and Gas Exception,
89 W. VA. L. REv. 1089 (1987) (history of oil and gas exception from Subtitle C of
RCRA).
27. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3258 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (1988)). EPA failed to act upon its determination pursuant to The Used Oil RecoveryAct of 1980 ("UORA"), Pub. L. No. 96-463, 94 Stat.
2055 (1980) that "certain types of used oils should be listed as a hazardous waste
because of their toxic constituents." HWTC, 861 F.2d at 272. Congress' enactment
of HSWA has served as a "further prod" to EPA. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 64 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5576). See
also WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES § 7.9 (Treatise Main Volume 1992) (discussing two year deadline EPA was
given within which to list or not list used oil).
28. RCRA § 3014, 42 U.S.C. § 6935. HSWA requires the following of EPA.
Not later than [November 8, 1985], the Administrator shall propose
whether to list or identify used automobile and truck crankcase oil as
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HSWA forced EPA to "make a final determination whether to list or
identify used automobile and truck crankcase oil and other used oil
as hazardous wastes under [RCRA] section 6921."29 Arguably, at
the expense of discouraging the recycling of used oil, the apparent
intent behind the HSWA provisions was to regulate used oil recycling activities so as to prevent such activities from posing poten0
tial hazards to the environment and human health.
As a result of the pressure placed on EPA by HSWA and Congress, on November 29, 1985, EPA announced its first proposal to
list used oil as a hazardous waste. 3 1 The Agency based its decision
upon the discovery that the substances contained in used oil are
"mobile, persistent, and biaccumulative, and capable of migration
in hazardous concentrations, and, therefore, that these wastes are
32
capable of causing... substantial harm if mismanaged."
hazardous waste under section 6921 of... title [42]. Not later than [November 8, 1986], the Administrator shall make a final determination
whether to list or identify used automobile and truck crankcase oil and
other used oil as hazardous wastes under section 6921....
RCRA § 3014, 42 U.S.C. § 6935(b).
Under RCRA § 3014, EPA was given a deadline of two years to decide whether
or not used crankcase and other oils were to be listed as hazardous waste. RCRA
§ 3014, 42 U.S.C. § 6935. Other standards were relaxed by Congress in order to
discourage any non-compliance with safe recycling. Legis. History of HSWA, H.R.
Rep. No. 198, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 5623 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.N. 5576, 5576. See also Beiring, supra note 2, at 172-73.
29. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1066 (quoting RCRA § 3014, 42 U.S.C. § 6935(b)). See
alsoYang, supranote 5, at 1370 (discussing "EPA's failure to promulgate timely and
stringent regulations," thereby prompting Congress to pass HSWA to pressure EPA
to act on its determinations); Beiring, supra note 2, at 171-72; Russiello, supranote
1, at 176; Karlin, supra note 26, at 1251.
30. RCRA § 8014, 42 U.S.C. § 6935(a); LEGis. HIsToRY OF HSWA, supra note
27. See also Beiring, supra note 2, at 172 (discussing legislative history behind
MSWA, which reflected an intention to use language of Amendments to ensure
protection of human health and environment); Russiello, supranote 1, at 176 (noting Congress' mandate to protect human health and environment).,
31. Roberts, supranote 6, at 1251 (citing Proposed Rule for the Identification
and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 50 Fed. Reg. 49,258 (1985) (proposed Nov. 29,
1985)). The proposed rule was based upon EPA findings that used oil "typically
and frequently contains significant quantities of lead and other metals, chlorinated
solvents, toulene, and napthalene which would pose a substantial hazard to human
health and environment, if improperly managed." Id. Consequently, the listing of
used oil as hazardous under RCRA would classify used oil as a hazardous waste
under CERCLA, subjecting the substance to additional regulation under the statute. Christopher D. Knopf, What's Included In The Exclusion: Understanding
Superfund's PetroleumExclusion, 5 FoRDHAM ENvr.. LJ. 3,16 (1993) (citing 50 Fed.

Reg. 49,627 (1985)). Further, the disposal of hazardous used oil would be regulated under Subtitle C of RCRA, while recycling of hazardous used oil would be
subject to further regulations proposed by EPA. 40 C.F.R. §§ 260-271 (1993).
32. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1075 (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 49,258, 49,267 (1985)). For
further discussion of the potential threat used oil poses to the environment, see
infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
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The proposal to list used oil resulted in an overwhelming
number of negative comments.3 3 Opponents to the listing argued
that listing used oil would lead to "uncontrolled dumping of oil
into the environment," thereby frustrating attempts at recycling
used oil.M In addition, the opponents claimed that businesses
would incur hefty expenditures on new reporting procedures or
management of their facilities in order to adhere to the listing
35
regulations.
Due to the overwhelming negative feedback, a final decision
was announced in 1986 not to list recycled used oil as a hazardous
waste.3 6 EPA's proposal not to list used oil was based upon the "be33. Hoeksema, supra note 6, at 1579-80. EPA subsequently filed a proposal to
hear comments on "listing only used oil destined for disposal as hazardous while
relying on special management standards to govern recycled used oil." 51 Fed.
Reg. 8206 (1986). EPA received over 800 comments from various associations including municipalities, generators and recyclers. Hoeksema, supranote 6, at 1579.
See 51 Fed. Reg. 8206 (vast majority of speakers at public hearings held around the
United States urged Agency not to list used oils as hazardous); Hearings on Hazardous Waste Matters,Before House Subcomm. on Oversight &Investigations, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 90-92 (1980) (statement of EPA).
34. See 22 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 488 (June 21, 1991) (discussing testimony of
American Petroleum Institute before Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of House Energy and Commerce Committee, which claimed that
California legislation listing used oil as hazardous waste "placed stricter restrictions
on its disposal, [and] has increased the cost of recycling and discouraged [recycling]"). See generally Decision Not to Adopt Proposed Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,902
(1986) (acknowledging hundreds of comments EPA received from broad spectrum of parties proposing that such listing would disrupt existing recycling
practices).
35. Russiello, supra note 1, at 171 (discussing that increasing costs could lead
to decrease in oil being used as a substitute fuel, and forcing businesses to dispose
of oil improperly in avoidance of compliance costs); Rodgers, supranote 27 (insisting that facilities that recycle used oil will need to fully comply with the standards
applicable to owners and operators of any hazardous waste treatment, storage and
disposal facility); J. Thomas Wolfe, Realistic Recycling, 37 FED. B. NEws & J. 90
(1990) (stating that legislators feared that economic burdens concomitant with
listing used oil would result in fewer businesses handling substance).
But see Russiello, supranote 1, at 171 (discussing threat posed to human health
and the environment, including report of over 60 used oil recycling facilities listed
as national priority hazardous waste sites). For further discussion of the threat to
human health and the environment caused by the mismanagement of used oil, see
infra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
36. Decision Not to Adopt Proposed Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,900 (1986). Proponents of this decision voiced "that the listing would not only discourage used oil
recycling, but would ultimately be environmentally counterproductive because
used-oil left unrecycled would be disposed of in manners posing greater risk than
recycling." Id.
Congressional hearings held by the House Subcommittee on Energy, Environment and Safety Issues Affecting Small Business discovered that EPA's proposal to
list used oil would in fact be environmentally counterproductive. Id. EPA, siding
with Congress, argued that listing would discourage recycling and in turn increase
detrimental disposal practices. Id. EPA stated that "this increased disposal could
result from decreased use of used oil as fuel by industrial burners and decreased
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lie [f] that listing would discourage recycling of used oil and could
have an environmentally counterproductive effect."3 7 Interest
groups who would lose economically as a result of this decision protested EPA's rationale.3 8 The reasoning behind the EPA decision
was successfully challenged before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in NRDC, as discussed
below.
B.

Circuit Court's Evaluation of EPA Decisions

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed EPA's decision not to list recycled used oil3 9
40
as a hazardous waste in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA.
acceptance of do-it-yourselfer oil by service stations (and similar establishments),
both attributable to costs and stigma associated with listing." Id. at 41,901.
The 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA") provides an alternative method to regulate used oil management practices. See Beiring, supra note 2, at 174-75 (discussing SARA and its effect on used oil practices).
See generally NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1066 (EPA based its decision "primarily on its perception that the stigma associated with labelling used oil as 'hazardous' would discour-age recycling").
37. Meske, supra note 3, at 370 (quoting Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste: Used Oil, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,901 (1986)). See also Beiring, supra note 2, at
174; Russiello, supra note 1, at 177 (listing used oil would result in uncontrolled
amount of disposal); Dickman, supra note 4, at 627 (used oil was not listed due to
stigmatic effects on oil recycling efforts); John Quarles & Arline M. Sheehan,
Superfund, and Toxic Substances, Recent RCRA Developments, C352 ALI-ABA 367

(1988).
38. Hoeksema, supra note 6, at 1579.
39. See HWTC, 861 F.2d at 271, (Definition of recycled oil is set forth in 42
U.S.C. § 6903(37) (1982) as "any used oil which is reused, following its original
use, for any purpose... including oil which is re-refined, reclaimed, burned or
reprocessed").
40. HWTC, 861 F.2d at 271. HWTC challenged a final EPA determination not
to list used oil destined for recycling and recycled oil as hazardous wastes. Id. EPA
defended its action by asserting that if it were to list recycled oil as hazardous,
'such a listing would attach the stigma of the label 'hazardous waste' to recycled
oil, thus discouraging recycling and its environmentally beneficial effects." Id. at
271.
The court addressed the issues of standing and jurisdiction at the outset. Id.
at 272-74. Since the HWTC represents multiple associations, it is permitted to
bring a suit on behalf of the other members who may not be able to bring suit
individually. Id. at 272-73. The organization's suit, however, must satisfy a twoprong test, referred to as the "Hunt Test." Id. at 273 (citing Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). Under this test,
HWTC was required to show that its members "suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, and that the
injury can be fairly traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by
a favorable decision." Id. The court found that the petitioner met all requirements of the test. Id. Declaring that it indeed had jurisdiction to hear this case, the
court relied upon the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), which "authorizes
judicial review of 'agency action', [including] the failure to promulgate a rule." Id.
at 274. (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, 702, 551(13) (1982)).
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The interpretations by EPA of RCRA section 6935 (b), and whether
the section authorized EPA to base its decision on nontechnical factors was critical to the court's analysis. 4 1 Pursuant to the controlling
provision, RCRA section 6935 (b), EPA was to determine "whether
to list or identify used automobile and track crankcase oil and
other used oil as hazardous wastes under section 6921."42 Thus, the
court vacated EPA's decision, holding that EPA was not allowed to
consider stigmatic consequences when deciding whether or not to
list recycled used oil as a hazardous waste, since those consequences
were not listed as a consideration under section 6921. 43
The court scrutinized EPA's statutory interpretation of RCRA
with the two-step inquiry established by the United States Supreme
Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.44 The first prong of the test consists of an analysis of whether
the intent of Congress was clear in allowing EPA to consider stigmatic consequences. 45 If so, then the intent be given effect by the
court and the agency. 46 The second prong was implicated if Con41. HWTC, 861 F.2d at 275. The court extensively reviewed the congressional
intent behind the relevant section in order to determine the proper interpretation
of the statute. Id.
42. Id. at 274 (quoting RCRA § 3014, 42 U.S.C. § 6935(b) (1988)). Under
section 6921 (a):
the criteria for identification or listing of a hazardous waste ... the Administrator shall ... develop and promulgate criteria for identifying the
characteristics of hazardous waste, and for listing hazardous waste ...
taking into account toxicity, persistence, and degradability in nature, potential for accumulation in tissue, and other related factors such as flammability, corrosiveness, and other hazardous characteristics.
RCRA § 3001 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (a).
43. HWTC, 861 F.2d at 271. Consequently, EPA's determination was vacated,
since EPA did not have a "statutorily authorized basis for its decision." NRDC, 25
F.3d at 1066. The court remanded the decision, directing EPA to reconsider
whether any of the technical listing criteria was met by recycled oil. HWTC, 861
F.2d at 277. The court explained that when making its listing decisions, EPA
needed to rely on statutorily based criteria. Id.
44. 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). The two-step inquiry is set forth infra notes
45-47 and in the accompanying text.
45. HWTC, 861 F.2d at 274. The court applied the two-step Chevron test to the
statutory interpretation in order to determine if the interpretation was "contrary to
law." Id. The Chevron Court was confronted with the question of whether EPA had
made a reasonable Construction of the term "stationary source," as set forth in the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 838. The Court determined that Congress had not previously spoken on this issue. Id. Thus, the Court
subsequently evaluated EPA's construction of the statute. Id. Recognizing the
broad discretion granted to EPA for implementing the Amendments of 1977, the
Court held EPA's construction of the provision as reasonable and permissible, allowing the definition to stand. Id. at 838, 866.
46. HWTC, 861 F.2d at 274 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). In Chevron,
the Court noted that it must reject a construction if it is contrary to clear congressional intent, since the judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory con-
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gress had not directly addressed the issue. The court was then required to consider "whether the agency's construction of the

statute is 'permissible,' 'rational and consistent with the statute.' "47
Applying the Chevronanalysis, the HWTC court interpreted and
evaluated the relevant statutory language and the grant of authority
by Congress to EPA. 4 8 The court first addressed the meaning of
RCRA section 6935(b),49 which the court found "required the EPA
to determine whether used oil meets the criteria for hazardous
waste specified in 42 U.S.C. § 6921."50
EPA tried to support its decision by arguing that section eight
of the Used Oil Recycling Act ("UORA") 5 1 directed EPA to "ensure
that the recovery and reuse of used oil are not discouraged" when
struction. 467 U.S. at 843, n.9. See also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281, 291
(1988) (stating that plain meaning of statute determined through analyzing "particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute
as a whole.").
47. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (quoting NLRB v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987)). See HWTC, 861 F.2d at 274
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). Ajudicial construction is not imposed upon
the agency if Congress is silent on the issue. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. Rather, the
agency construction is to be evaluated. Id. The court is not to determine if the
agency construction was the only permissible one. Rather, the construction must
only be consistent with the statute. Id. at 843, n.11.
48. HWTC, 861 F.2d at 274-77. The court looked to the historical development of the statute to determine how Congress directed EPA in its consideration
of listing used oil. Id. at 275-76. The court noted that Congress intended that EPA
consider the impact listing used oil would have on recycling and reuse. Id. Subsequently, Congress separated the effect on recycling from EPA's decision, warranting consideration of recycling only after the final decision was made by EPA. Id.
49. Id. at 274. (citing RCRA § 3014(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6935(b) which states that:
"the Administrator shall make a final determination whether to list or identify used
automobile and truck crankcase oil and other used oil as hazardous wastes under
section 6921 .... ").
50. HWTC, 861 F.2d at 274. To ascertain the meaning of RCRA § 3014, the
court followed the analysis set forth in K Mart by looking to the "particular statutory language at issue." HWTC, 861 F.2d at 274 (quoting K Mart, 486 U.S. at 291).
The language was silent regarding stigmatic characteristics, referring only to technical characteristics to be considered when deciding to list a substance. Id.
51. Used Oil Recycling Act ("UORA"), Pub. L. No. 96-463, 94 Stat. 2055-59
(1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C). Section eight of
UORA sets forth a deadline for EPA to determine whether used oil is characteristic
of a hazardous waste under RCRA. HWTC, 861 F.2d at 271. The determination, as
well as a detailed statement of the determination, were to be reported to Congress.
Id. In addition, the Act mandated a deadline by which time EPA had to promulgate regulations establishing standards and requirements for the treatment of recycled oil. Id. The regulations instituted by EPA were designed to protect the
public health and environment from any potential hazards associated with recycled oil. Id.
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determining the listing of substances. 52 Thus, since commentary
received by EPA illustrated the potential uncontrolled disposal of
wastes, EPA argued that it was forced not to list used oil in order to
fulfill the purpose of UORA. 53 Rejecting this argument, the court
54
considered "the language and design of the statute as a whole."
The court found that section eight only required that EPA make a
single determination regarding used oil, and report that determination to Congress, since the court concluded that EPA's obligation
under section eight was fulfilled, the section was no longer in
55
effect.
Under its interpretation of section eight of UORA, the only
task of the HWI'C court was to consider what RCRA required. Since
RCRA only referred to technical considerations, Congress' failure
to mention any stigmatic considerations led the court to conclude
that only technical criteria clearly stated under section 6921 should
be used.5 6 Based on the conclusion reached by the court in HWTC,
the Court of Appeals in NRDC remanded the November 1986 decision to the Agency to further "consider whether any recycled oils
met the technical criteria for listing promulgated under 42 U.S.C.

§ 6921." 5 7

52. HW'C, 861 F.2d at 275 (quoting Used Oil Recycling Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-463). For further discussion of EPA's argument relating to UORA § 8, see
Beiring, supra note 2, at 176-79; Russiello, note 1, at 178-79.
EPA further asserted that § 7 of UORA creates a statutory ambiguity. Russiello, supra note 1, at 179. It was alleged that Congress intended that the Agency
have two tracks 'through which to deal with recycled oil, with identical authority on
each track. Id. See HWTC, 861 F.2d at 275. Track one allowed EPA to regulate
recycled oil without listing it as a hazardous waste, while track two provided for
regulation of the substance by listing. HWTC, 861 F.2d at 275. Contrary to EPA's
statutory interpretation, the court rejected the argument. Id. at 275. See also Beiring, supra note 2, at 177-80 (discussing two ostensible options given to EPA).
53. For further discussion of the comments received by EPA, see supra notes
33-35 and accompanying text. See also Hoeksema, supra note 6, at 1579-80 ("As a
result of the overwhelmingly negative responses to the proposal, and the realization that listing used oil as a hazardous waste would likely lead to uncontrolled
dumping of oil into the environment, EPA reversed its decision .... ").
54. HWTC, 861 F.2d at 275-77 (quoting K Mart, 486 U.S. at 291).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 275. While interpreting statutory language, the court looked to "the
plain meaning of a statute by examining.., the 'particular statutory language at
issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.'" Id. at 274
(quoting K Mart, 486 U.S. at 291).
57. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1066. EPA, in response to the court's decision to remand in HWTC, reported that the listing decision surrounding used oil would
sprout from one of the following:
(1) listing all used oil as hazardous,
(2) listing only certain categories of used oil as hazardous, or
(3) not listing any used oils as hazardous, but relying instead on other
federal regulations.
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In addition to the HWTC decision, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia set forth a relevant rule of statutory interpretation in American Petroleum Institute v. EPA.58 In American Petroleum,
the court partially upheld EPA's decision to preclude land treatment as a method of treating certain hazardous wastes. 59 However,
the court vacated the part of the decision based on exempting cer60
tain RCRA restrictions from EPA's evaluation of land disposals.
In arriving at its holding, the court in American Petroleum
looked to EPA's interpretation of RCRA. 6 ' The court noted that
when an agency "bases a decision on a standard it unjustifiably believes was mandated by Congress, [its] decision must not be enforced, even though [it] might be able to adopt the very same
standard in the exercise of its discretion." 62 Since EPA could not

support its decision to abandon certain RCRA restrictions, the
Id. at 1066 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 48,000, at 48,019-48,021 (1991)).
58. 906 F.2d 729 (1990). Petitioners bringing this action included the American Petroleum Institute, the American Iron and Steel Institute, the Chemical Manufacturers Association ("CMA") and the National Association of Metal Finishers.
Id. at 732.
59. American Petroleum, 906 F.2d at 731. Petitioners challenged EPA's decision
that RCRA precluded them from considering land treatment as a method for treating hazardous wastes. Id. NRDC, CMC and HWTC also contested part of an EPA
decision establishing treatment standards for K061, a hazardous waste. Id.
60. American Petroleum, 906 F.2d at 732, 742. The court held that EPA was in
fact precluded by RCRA from considering land treatment of hazardous wastes, and
consequently denied the petition for review on this issue. Id. Review was also denied since EPA exhibited sufficient reasoning for its abandonment of comparative
risk. Id. Regarding treatment standards for K061 hazardous waste, the court
granted petition for review as a result of EPA's unlawfully exempting factors from
its consideration. Id.
61. American Petroleum,906 F.2d at 735. The court used the test established in
Chevron to review the EPA interpretation of RCRA. Id. at 740. Following the twostep analysis, the court concluded that Congress had not spoken on this issue, and
a review of the agency construction was necessary. Id. at 741. The court stated that
any permissible construction by EPA "must comport with the broader 'statutory
purpose' of the RCRA." Id. The court remanded the issue for a determination as
to whether the construction by EPA was permissible. Id.
62. Id. at 735 (quoting International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No.
474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). See also Securities and Exch.
Comm'n v. Chenery Co., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) ("[An] administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its
powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.").
The court in American Petroleum needed to examine whether the EPA interpretation of RCRA precluded the Agency from considering land treatment in its deci-

sion. American Petroleum, 906 F.2d at 735. The petitioners argued that land

treatment was a necessary consideration to the decision, and that EPA therefore

misinterpreted RCRA. Id. The court turned to the language of the statute and
found, however, that the language supported EPA's interpretation of RCRA. Id.
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In New York v. Reilly, 64 the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia remanded for further consideration the part of an EPA
decision which the court determined was comprised of insufficient
evidentiary support.65 In the words of the court, the decision
lacked "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." 66 Thus, since EPA did not
adequately support its decision not to impose a ban on the burning
of lead-acid vehicle batteries, the court remanded this decision for
67
an explanation from EPA as to why it did not impose the ban.
C.

Statutory Interpretation

Over the past twenty years, courts have attempted to resolve
exchanges between EPA and parties who have challenged EPA's
congressional grant of authority. In interpreting the boundaries of
EPA discretion, these courts have evaluated the agency's authority
according to the different standards, as set forth below.
1.

Broad DiscretionAllowed to EPA

When interpreting the numerous provisions of RCRA, the
courts have given great deference to EPA interpretations. 68 In
63. American Petroleum, 906 F.2d at 729. The court explained the two propositions supporting this decision. Id. First, the court stated that an agency's interpretive discretion is bound by its previous interpretations of RCRA. Id. at 742.
Second, the court recognized that an agency is entitled to construe its own regulations. Id. In conclusion, the court leaned toward forcing EPA to comply with its
statutory mandate to prescribe treatment standards for K061, a hazardous waste.
Id.
64. 969 F.2d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
65. Reilly, 969 F.2d at 1149. The court upheld EPA's decision to drop the
waste separation provision, since the decision was adequately supported under the
statute. Id. Subsequently, the court remanded the second decision back to EPA
due to inadequate support regarding a ban on lead-acid vehicle battery combustion. Id.
66. Id. at 1150-51 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,
477 (1951)). Later in its opinion, the court noted that it was "extremely deferential
to administrative agencies in cases involving technical rulemaking decisions." Id.
at 1149. The court further stated that "as long as Congress delegates power to an
agency to regulate on the borders of the unknown, courts cannot interfere with
reasonable interpretations of equivocal evidence." Id. at 1151-52 (citing Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1505 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
67. Reilly, 969 F.2d at 1149. According to the court, the decision did not represent the best demonstrated technology for reducing harmful incinerator emissions. Id.
68. See generally NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1068-70; Reilly, 969 F.2d at 1150; NRDC v.
EPA, 907 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Lo Shippers Action Comm. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 857 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1089 (1989).
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1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-

bia Circuit in NRDC69 , while discussing RCRA, stated that "the statute gives the Administrator broad discretion in determining the
criteria for listing wastes and in the actual listing of specific
wastes." 70 Further, the court in Lo ShippersAction Committee v. Interstate Commerce Commission7 1 additionally held that the agency should
be allowed "due deference normally owed an agency's interpretation of a statute committed to its care." 72
Similarly, in a case involving the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 73 the
court in Reilly allowed the EPA Administrator to be "free to exercise
his discretion," since Congress had not assigned specific weights to
any of the factors that EPA was to consider. 74 Thus, EPA can either
emphasize or deemphasize particular factors. The court further
stated that it accords administrative agency decisions extreme
deference. 75
2. Arbitray and Capricious
In reaching its decision in HWTC, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia applied the arbitrary and capricious standard
of review. 76 A decision will be invalidated under this standard if it is
69. 907 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The petitioner challenged EPA regulations for the disposal of hazardous wastes by deep injection. Id. at 1149. The court
determined that EPA ignored its statutory duty to promulgate regulations in this
area and failed to sufficiently rebut NRDC's statutory challenges. Id. The court,
therefore, remanded this issue for further proceedings. Id.
70. NRDC, 907 F.2d at 1159, n.12 (citing RCRA § 3001(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6921(a)-(b)). The court looked to the plain meaning and congressional intent
of the statute in order to define an ambiguity in the statute. Id. at 1159. Additionally, the court examined the legislative history to aid its determination. Id. at 1160.
71. 857 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1988). This dispute arose over allowances provided to Lo Shippers Action Committee which the members argued were inadequate. Id. at 803. The petitioners also sought "the establishment of Commissionordered allowance structures." Id.
72. Id. at 807. Upon review, the court held the Commission was allowed to
take appropriate action in its discretion and thus, denied the petition. Id. at 80708.
73. The Clean Air Act of 1988 ("CAA"), § 111 (a) (1) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 74017671 (1988).
74. Reilly, 969 F.2d at 1150 (citing Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d
1336, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). For further discussion of the facts and holding of
Reilly, see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
75. Id. at 1152. The court upheld EPA's decision not to promulgate materials
separation rules. Id. The agency was allowed, in its discretion, to balance the costs
and benefits of air against nonair. Id. The petitioners alleged that the Administrator's decision to omit factors from its decision making process, without any substanial supporting evidence, constituted an arbitrary and capricious decision. Id. at
1150. The court concluded, however, that the evidence presented by EPA provided sufficient evidence to support its change of view. Id.
76. HWTC, 861 F.2d at 274 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 708(2) (A)).
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"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." 7 7 The Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia has previously noted that when reviewing an agency's action under the arbitrary and capricious standard, a court must affirm the agency if it has articulated a satisfactory explanation for its
action including a "rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made."78 Further, the Supreme Court in Chevron
noted that if Congress left a legislative gap for an agency to supplement, the regulations are "given controlling weight unless they are
79
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."
3. Plainly Erroneous
The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia have articulated a "plainly erroneous" standard of review of agency decisions. The Supreme Court has held that with
respect to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, "provided it does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute, such
an interpretation must be given controlling weight unless it is
'plainly erroneous' or inconsistent with the regulation it interprets."8 0 Thus, agencies are afforded a presumption that their construction of the relative statute is permissible unless it impedes the
statutory purpose.
77. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)). The court first looked to the framework for listing hazardous wastes. For further discussion of the framework, see
supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the listing criteria, see HWTC, 861 F.2d at 271 (discussing criteria and requirements RCRA lists for
EPA to follow); American Petroleum, 906 F.2d at 732-33; Yang, supra note 5, at 136970; Reilly, 969 F.2d at 1150-51.
78. American Petroleum, 906 F.2d at 737-38 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); ALLTEL Corp. v. FCC,
838 F.2d 551, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Finding that EPA produced satisfactory reasons as to why it decided to abandon the comparative risk analysis, the court in
American Petroleum upheld the decision as not arbitrary or capricious. 906 F.2d at
738.
79. Chew-on, 467 U.S. at 843-44 & n.14 (citing United States v. Morton, 467
U.S. 822, 834 (1984)). See also, Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981);
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 (1977); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
United States, 299 U.S. 232, 235-37 (1936)). The Chevron Court noted that a gap
left by Congress is an express delegation of authority to the relative agency to "elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
80. Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1914 (1993). The Court in Stinson addressed the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit holding that the commentary to the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines") is not binding on federal courts. Id. In so holding, the Court decided that an explanatory or interpretative commentary in the Guidelines is authoritative, unless it violates the United States Constitution. Id.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit followed the "plainly erroneous" standard in Hazardous
Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly.8 ' The court noted that "because
the EPA is charged with the administration of RCRA, we defer to its
interpretation whenever the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue."8 2 Further, the court will accept an
agency's interpretation of its regulations as long as it is not "plainly
83
wrong" or "plainly erroneous."

III.

THE FACTUAL SETTING OF

NRDC

In May 1992, EPA restated its decision not to list as hazardous
any used oil destined for disposal.8 4 EPA determined that used oil
failed to meet the threshold requirements which would warrant its
listing. 85 EPA concluded that Subtitle C of RCRA already regulated
most of the oils and that used oil destined for disposal would therefore still be covered under Subtitle C.86 Thus, under this interpre81. 938 F.2d 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Petitioners alleged that North Carolina's
hazardous waste treatment program was ineligible under RCRA, due to its inconsistency with federal government programs. Id. at 1392. North Carolina enacted a
statute requiring dilution of commercial hazardous waste treatment discharges
into surface waters. Id. EPA disputed the claim, finding the state statute to be
consistent. Id.
82. -WTC, 938 F.2d at 1395. The court added that an agency's interpretation
will be upheld as long as it is reasonable and consistent with the statutory purpose.
Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45).
83. Id. (quoting Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 919 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)). The court held that EPA's interpretation
of the statutory language was consistent with the purpose of RCRA, and therefore,
permissible under that statute. Id. at 1396-97. Further, the court noted that the
language of the statute allowed "the agency enormous latitude in structuring its
own implementing regulations and in interpreting them." Id. at 1396.
84. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1066-67. This Final Rule promulgated by EPA announced the deferral of EPA's listing decision with respect to recycled oils. Id. at
1067 (citing 57 Fed. Reg. at 21,524 (1992)). Subsequently, on September 10, 1992,
EPA issued another determination stating that recycled oil would not be listed as a
hazardous waste. Id. (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 41,566 (1992)). EPA additionally established regulations concerning the management of recycled used oils. Id. See also,
Kline, supra note 4, at 216 (discussing final regulations issued by EPA on May 20,
1992).
The court in NRDC noted that in the present case the issue it was addressing
did not pertain to recycled used oils. 25 F.3d at 1067.
85. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1067 (citing Final Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 21,531 (1992)).
EPA found no grounds to list used oil since it was not "typically and frequently"
hazardous. Id.
86. Id. (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 21,528 (1992)). See also Dickman, supra note 4, at
627 (explaining Subtitle C coverage for used oil destined for disposal exhibiting
hazardous characteristics, and coverage under Subtitle I if stored in underground
storage tank). But see Flannery & Lannan, supra note 26 (discussing history of oil
and gas waste exception from Subtitle C of RCRA).
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tation, there was no need to additionally list gasoline-powered
87
engine oils under RCRA.
In response to EPA's decision to exclude used oil from the hazardous waste list, NRDC, the Association of Petroleum Re-Refiners,
and HWTC brought an action against EPA.8 8 The petitioners challenged the basis for the Agency's decision not to list, alleging that
EPA failed to comply with RCRA and EPA's hazardous waste listing
regulations. 8 9 The court faced the issue of whether EPA's determination was inconsistent with RCRA and EPA's listing regulations. 90
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
EPA's decision not to list used oil as a hazardous waste was reasonable. 9 1 Further, the court concluded that used oil did not have to
be listed as a hazardous waste, even though it displayed one of the
characteristics under the statutory criteria for a characteristic haz92
ardous waste.
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Narrative

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit conceded that EPA was not compelled by the statutory
87. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1067. Further, EPA declared that current regulations
would cover any proposed risks which mismanagement of the oils would pose. Id.
The remaining oils did not meet the initial threshold requirements to mandate a
listing. Id.
88. Id. at 1063.
89. Id. at 1064. Prior to addressing the merits of the case, the court addressed
the argument that petitioners lacked standing to raise this claim. Id. at 1067. Intervenors argued that since used oil is already regulated under RCRA Subtitle C,
there was no basis for an injury to the petitioners for EPA's failure to regulate a
substance under the same regulation. Id. The court concluded that the failure of
the petitioners to establish a right to relief did not bar them from crossing the
"threshold of justiciability." Id.
90. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1064. The court's analysis comprised two sections. First,
the court addressed EPA's decision not to list gasoline-powered engine oils under
40 C.F.R. § 261.11(a)(1) (1990). NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1067. Second, the court examined EPA's decision not to list any used oils under 40 C.F.R. § 261.11 (a) (3)
(1990). NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1070.
91. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1069-70. The Agency adopted a construction of the
statute which afforded it considerable discretion when employing any of the three
criteria utilized in making listing determinations. Id. See Identification and Listing
of Coke By-Products Wastes, 57 Fed. Reg. 37,288 (1992). For further discussion of
the three listing criteria, see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
92. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1069. The court recognized the Agency's authority to
exercise its discretion, either in a broad or narrow manner, under the criteria set
forth in the statute relating to the listing of a particular waste. Id. Thus, the court
permitted EPA to decide whether to list every substance which exhibits a certain
characteristic or not to list such a substance, based upon the fulfillment of particular criteria. Id.
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language in RCRA to list a substance on the sole basis that the substance exhibits a single characteristic. 93 On the contrary, the Administrator has been allowed broad discretion in making listing
determinations under section 6921 (a) provided that a decision is
94
based upon technical criteria promulgated in the statute.
By examining congressional intent and the plain meaning of
the language in the statute, the court interpreted the broad power
delegated to EPA by Congress as manifesting the intention to give
the Agency "substantial room to exercise its expertise in determining the appropriate grounds for listing." 95 The court reliecprimarily on its prior decision in HWiTC that EPA may not rely on
extraneous factors when making a listing determination. 96 Further,
the court mandated that the support for the Agency's decision must
97
come from technical criteria listed in the statute.
The court concluded that EPA's interpretation of its listing reg98
ulations under RCRA section 6921 did not pose a contrary result.

Due to the wide discretion afforded to EPA, the court held that
after examining the congressional intent behind the statute, that
EPA interpretations of RCRA were reasonable and consistent with
its grant of authority under the statute. 99 The court determined
93. Id. at 1069. The petitioners alleged that EPA's decision not to list used oil
was contrary to law, and that RCRA obligated EPA to list oils if they exhibit toxicity.
Id. at 1067-68; 40 C.F.R. § 261.11(a) (1).
94. NRDC, 25 F.d at 1067. For further discussion of EPA decisions based on
technical criteria, see supra notes 39-67 and accompanying text.
95. Id. at 1070. The court evaluated petitioner's daim that the Administrator
lacked discretion to decline to list used oil. Id. at 1067. Petitioners alleged that the
word "shall" indicates a lack of discretion on the part of the Agency in listing decisions. Id. at 1068. The court, however, rejected the argument on the grounds that
the petitioners misquoted the statute by omitting the word "only." Id. By inserting
"only" into the statute, it establishes the presence of a toxic characteristic as a prerequisite to listing, but not an obligation to list. Id. at 1068.
96. Id. at 1069. The court restated its decision in HWTC that due to the
HSWA, EPA was expressly directed not to rely on extraneous factors, but to base
determinations "under section 6921." Id.
97. Id. The court stated that "EPA is required by statute to base its used oil
listing decisions exclusively on its technical listing criteria promulgated under
RCRA section 6921." Id. at 1069.
98. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1069. Petitioners argued that EPA applied contradictory
interpretations of sections (a) (1) and (a) (3). Id. The court found that the statutory section allowed the Administrator to base the decision on any of the three
grounds for listing in the regulation. Id. For discussion of the three grounds for
listing, see supra note 17. Thus, the Administrator could list used oil as hazardous
on the grounds that it exhibits the toxicity characteristic. Id.at 1069.
99. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1067-70. The court examined other listing determinations, and recognized that the interpretation of C.F.R. § 261.11 devised to EPA
broad discretion when considering any of its three listing criteria for hazardous
wastes. Id. at 1069.
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that the petitioners failed to establish a "blatant inconsistency with
regulatory language that would justify [the court's] rejection of
EPA's interpretation of its own regulation."1 0 0 In the same way,
EPA has been free to deemphasize or emphasize any of the factors
considered when making the listing determination. 10 Therefore,
EPA was within its authority not to list used oil as a hazardous waste
02
even though the substance exhibited toxicity characteristics.
The court dismissed the petitioners' argument that EPA acted
arbitrarily in its decision since "no other environmental statute can
regulate disposal as effectively as Subtitle C's expansive 'cradle-tograve' hazardous waste disposal mechanism."' 0 3 While EPA listing
criteria require that EPA consider other regulatory programs when
trying to control a hazardous substance, the court refused to consider the argument finding that it was not raised in a timely
04
manner.
The petitioners also challenged EPA's reliance on the toxiGity
characteristic leaching procedure ("TCLP") as tending toward
under-regulation of hazardous wastes.' 05 The court looked to the
100. Id. at 1068. The court reached its decision by stating an analogy. Id.
While examining the meanings of "only" and "shall," the court found that the
statement " 'cross only if the light is green' " did not prohibit pedestrians from
considering other factors when deciding whether or not to cross. Id. Thus, the
court asserted, the same reasoning holds true for the EPA interpretation of RCRA.
Id. The court also referred to Stinson and HWTC in recognizing an agency's interpretation of its regulations. Id. at 1068-69 (citing Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1919;
HWTC, 938 F.2d at 1395).
101. Id. at 1071. Looking to precedent and the criteria set forth in the statute,
the court determined that EPA had been afforded great discretion to give greater
weight to factors which it deemed appropriate. Id. See Reilly, 969 F.2d at 1150; Lo
Shippers, 857 F.2d at 806.
102. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1074. The court held that the agency was free to evaluate the substance under the balancing test set forth under the statute. Id. For
further discussion of the criteria considered under the balancing test, see supra
note 17.
103. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1072 n.4.
104. Id. at 1067 n.3. The court concluded that the petitioners first raised this
argument in their reply brief, not allowing EPA sufficient time to prepare for this
argument. Id. Accordingly, the court dismissed the argument. Id.
105. Id. at 1072-73. The petitioners relied upon several instances where EPA
discovered the application of TCLP to be problematic. Id. at 1072. Consequently,
EPA concluded that the use of the TCLP test would result in underregulation of
hazardous used oils. Id. (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 46,354 (1990)), which stated that
TCLP test "tends to underestimate the leachablility of hazardous constituents from
oily wastes"). See also 55 Fed. Reg. 11,851 (1990) ("It is particularly difficult to
predict the behavior of oily wastes in the TCLP test."); SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP., USED OIL CHARACTERIZATION SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM

(Aug. 30, 1991) (report prepared by EPA contractor indicating that clogging during TCLP "introduced potential measurment errors" into EPA's commissioned

study of used oil toxicity).
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applicable time for judicial review and determined that it had
lapsed so there was no acceptable forum within which this argu10 6
ment could be heard.
B.

Dissent

Judge Wald concurred in the majority's analysis of the issue
involving statutory construction. 10 7 Judge Wald dissented, however,
from the majority's refusal to consider the petitioners' challenge to
the testing procedure on the notion that it was not timely raised.' 0 8
Although the majority accepted EPA's statutory interpretation and
the decision not to list, the majority did not require EPA to present
any factual basis for its decision. 10 9
Judge Wald stated that the majority should have analyzed current management practices for used oil in the interest of ensuring
proper management of the substance." 0 Further, Judge Wald
found that barring the challenger's arguments was inappropriate
because the majority's analysis ignored the rationale for the decision."' Referring to a previous case before the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Judge Wald recalled that
106. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1072-73. The decision by EPA to use the TCLP test to
identify toxic characteristics in solid wastes, including used oil, was handed down
on March 29, 1990. Id. at 1073. According to RCRA § 7006(a), a petitioner has
ninety days to seekjudicial review of this petition. Id. at 1073.
107. Id. at 1078. For further discussion of the majority's holding, see supra
notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
108. Id. at 1074 (Wald, J., dissenting). The petitioners claims were found not
to be timely raised on appeal and not to be timely raised below. Id. at 1078. Thus,
the arguments addressing the past records of mismanagement of used oil and
EPA's disregard of plausible management scenarios were not heard. Id. For further discussion of the court's decision to dismiss petitioners arguments, see supra
notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
109. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1080. The majority relied upon a reading of the relevant section of the petitioners' brief in concluding that the petitioners were not
attacking EPA on the grounds that the decision lacked factual support. Id. at 1071
n.4. Instead, the court found the argument to be based upon the "plain language
and purpose [of RCRA and the agency's regulation, which] forecloses EPA from
concluding that any plausible mismanagement of used oil will not occur." Id.
Thus, the court stated that to entertain the petitioners' argument would be unfair
to the Agency, since EPA did not have proper notice of the attack by the petitioners on the factual sufficiency of the decision. Id.
110. Id. at 1078. Instead, the dissent and the executive director of the HWTC,
asserted that the "two judges 'turned themselves into a jurisprudence pretzel to
come to this decision.'" COURT UPHOLDS EPA DECISION THAT USED OIL SHOULD
NOT BE LISTED As HAZARDOUS UNDER RCRA, 25 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 229 (1984).
111. NRDC, 25 F.Sd at 1080. The petitioners challenged EPA evidence supporting a no-listing decision. The majority, however, invoked principles of appellate briefing, resulting in the claim never being considered. Id. at 1078-80.
Consequently, without a timely argument attacking the evidence for the decision,
the court did not have to consider the basis for the decision. Id. The dissent ar-
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the court "only recently... held that the EPA could not presume
without evidentiary support that hazardous waste would be managed in a particular, undesirable manner."1 12 Further, the dissent
reasoned that the same standard should be applied in the present
case, requiring EPA to cite evaluations rendering the current mismanagement standards as sufficient for the no-list decision. 113
Judge Wald emphasized that "EPA need[ed] to make its case
that existing regulation of used oil are enough; to require less
would turn rulemaking and appellate review into a game of hide
and seek .... ,,114 For this reason, the dissent favored reconsideration of the decision to evaluate the assessment of the regulatory
scheme designed to prevent used oil from contaminating the
environment."15
C.

Critical Analysis: The District of Columbia's Inadequate
Discussion of EPA Authority

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia correctly
analyzed EPA's statutory interpretation by engaging in the Chevron
two-step analysis." 6 Pursuant to the first step of this analysis, the
court was required to decide whether Congress clearly intended to
obligate the Administrator to list a substance exhibiting a toxic
characteristic." 7 Second, if Congress was found not to have directly addressed this issue, the court must determine whether the
agency's construction of the statute was permissible, rational, and
gued that the argument was raised in discussion between the two parties, and that
EPA had notice of this claim so the basis should have been considered. Id. at 1079.

112. Id. at 1080 (citing Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 2 F.3d 438). The dissent further discussed the treatment of Edison Elec. by the court in NRDC, commanding
that " 'the [a]gency must at least provide some factual support for its conclusion
that such a mismanagement scenario is plausible.' "NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1080 (quot-

ing Edison, 2 F.3d at 446).
113. NROC, 25 F.3d at 1080 (Wald, J., dissenting). Judge Wald would have
remanded the decision for further examination of the "regulatory landscape" EPA
relied upon for its no-list decision. Id.
114. Id. at 1080 (Wald, J., dissenting).
115. Id. Since EPA has wrestled with this decision for over fifteen years, and
has withdrawn its previous proposal to list used oil, the dissent asserted that an
adequate factual basis should have been shown to support this decision. Id.
116. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1068-70. For further discussion of the two-step analysis
evaluating an agency's statutory interpretation, see supra, notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
117. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1068-70. The court found that the word "only" used in
the statute granted EPA discretion in its listing decisions. Id. at 1069. For further
discussion of the court's examination of.congressional intent, see supranotes 39-67
and accompanying text.
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consistent with the statute. 118 The court sought to ascertain the intent of Congress, and concluded that Congress' broad delegation of
power to EPA to develop listing criteria illustrates its intent for the
Agency to have substantial room in decision making."19
While the court's opinion in NRDC appeared to be consistent
with existing case law, the amount of discretion allowed EPA by the
NRDC court increases the already broad discretion afforded to EPA
in its listing determinations. In previous cases, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia limited EPA's decision making by demanding that evidence be shown to support the Agency's determinations. 120 This limitation was narrowed in HWTC, when the court
held that the decision must be based upon the technical criteria set
forth in the statute. 121 In NBDC, however, the court afforded EPA
broad discretion in its decision regarding used oil.122 Specifically,
the court did not require that EPA show that specific criteria were
met or provide any evidentiary support.'

23

While the holding in NRDC was a logical extension of the reasoning behind the court's decision in HWTC, the NRDC court failed
to examine the basis for EPA's listing decision, assuming that EPA
relied upon technical criteria. In HWTC, however, the court mandated that the EPA decision be founded upon the criteria set forth
124
in RCRA.
Notably, the dissent in NRDC correctly pointed out that the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals should have considered arguments relating to the factual basis for such a decision, since this is
118. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Through its analysis the court did not find any
inconsistencies with the statutory language and EPA's interpretation to warrant a
rejection of EPA's interpretation. N!RDC, 25 F.3d at 1068.
119. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1070. The court, after examining the statute, concluded that the multi-factor balancing test allowed EPA to consider "such factors as
may be appropriate." Id. at 1069. Thus, the court interpreted this language as permitting wide discretion for EPA listing decisions. Id. See also NRDC, 907 F.2d at
1159 n.12; Identification and Listing of Coke By-Products Wastes, 57 Fed. Reg.
37,288 (1992).
120. See HWrC,861 F.2d at 270. The court in HWTC remanded the EPA decision for further consideration, since EPA had considered stigmatic consequences
not listed within the statutory language of RCRA. Id. For further discussion of
I-WTC, see supra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
121. HW1C, 861 F.2d at 270. The court noted that it "expressly forbade" EPA
to consider extraneous factors when making its listing determinations. See NRDC,
25 F.d at 1069.

122. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1074 (Wald, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. HWTC, 861 F.2d at 270-74. For further discussion of HWITC, see supra
notes 39-58 and accompanying text. See also Karlin, supra note 26;John Quarles &
Arline M. Sheehan, Superfund, and Toxic Substances, Recent RCRA Developments, C352
ALI-ABA 367 (1988).
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critical to a complete analysis of an EPA determination. 12 5 The
court should have clearly allowed the merits to be heard, rather
than "risk reaching an improvident outcome by refusing to review
the factual basis (or lack thereof) for the EPA's decision."1 26
The particular basis for EPA's decision was critical to the fairness of the decision, especially in light of the Edison Electric decision. 127 It must be noted that the court previously demanded a
showing from EPA "to provide some factual support for its conclusion that such a mismanagement scenario is plausible."' 28 In the
instant case, EPA should have been compelled by the court to prove
that existing regulations concerning used oil are sufficient. By failing to do so, the court overlooked an important opportunity to prevent a potential tragedy, especially with the "high stakes involved
for clean air, soil, and groundwater."'

29

125. NRDC, 25 F.Sd at 1072. The court concluded that the petitioners' challenge to the factual basis of EPA's decision would not be addressed. Id. In reaching its decision, the court relied on procedural rules and existing case law
requiring that the argument be raised in the opening brief. Id.
The dissent contested the majority decision dismissing the petitioners' arguments, asserting that the petitioners in their first brief "challenged EPA's determination that other environmental statutes controlled any plausible mismanagement
scenarios." Id. at 1078. In previous examinations of the situation, EPA compiled
numerous fact findings illustrating the threatening capacity of used oil on the environment and human health. Id. at 1075. EPA determined that used oils "are capable of causing (indeed, repeatedly have caused) substantial harm if mismanaged."
Id.
126. Id. at 1079 (Wald, J., dissenting). Judge Wald asserted that, rather than
dismissing the claim, the court could have ordered supplemental briefing to provide EPA with an opportunity to respond to petitioner's argument. Id. Further,
the court's failure to consider either the factual basis or current management practices for oil in upholding EPA's decision not to list used oil as a hazardous waste
was criticized as being "intellectually dishonest" by Richard Fortuna, the Executive
Director of the HWTC. 25 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 229 (1994).
127. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1079-80. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia held that "the EPA could not presume without evidentiary support
that hazardous waste would be managed in a particular, undesirable manner." Id.
at 1080 (quoting Edison, 2 F.d at 438). The court required EPA to produce evidence to support its contention that waste had been disposed of in a particular
manner; lacking such support, the decision could not stand. Edison, 2 F.3d at 446.
The court has previously either vacated or remanded EPA decisions which
lacked evidentiary support based upon the technical criteria in the statute. For
further discussion of the court's treatment of past EPA decisions, and the support
demanded by the court, see supra notes 39-67 and accompanying text.
128. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1080 (Wald, J., dissenting) (quoting Edison, 2 F.3d at
446). The dissent noted that EPA has not been afforded the presumption that a
hazardous waste would be mismanaged in a particular situation, without any evidentiary support. Id. (citing Edison, 2 F.3d at 438).
129. Id. at 1080 (Wald, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that EPA had not
produced any records as to whether the statutory framework which is to prevent
contamination of the environment will work in practice. Id.
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V.

THE LASTING

EFFcErs

OF THE

EPA DECISION

The NRDC holding will likely have the effect of increasing the
discretion of EPA. The court's reasoning makes it clear that future
EPA listing decisions will be upheld as long as EPA has some grant
of authority to make the determination, regardless of considering
any management practices or the factual basis for the listing determination. There is no specific grant of authority allowing EPA to
apply its expertise determining the listing of substances, since no
criteria were held by the court to be compelling. Congressional intent, as shown through the inquires established by the court, is to
be controlling.1 3 0 The idea that Congress intended EPA to have
wide discretion in determining, based upon its expertise, that a substance should or should not be listed regardless of any threatening
characteristics it may exhibit, was illustrated in NRDC.13 ' Consequently, it will be up to EPA alone to determine the listing of a
substance, without any checks upon its authority or discretion. Ultimately, the only limitations placed upon EPA for its decision are
32
grounded in statutory criteria.'
The NRDC decision should please businesses, specifically oil recyclers, who will not be burdened with the exorbitant costs associ33
ated with hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal.'
Additionally, the fear of decreasing incentive to recycle by listing
used oil should diminish. Instead, according to EPA's rationale,
businesses will now have a greater motivation to recycle without fear
34
of EPA action.'
130. Id. at 1070. For a discussion concerning how congressional intent is controlling under the two-step analysis, see supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
131. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1070. Since the petitioners failed to establish that EPA
was required by statute to list every waste which displayed a hazardous characteristic, the court could not hold the EPA interpretation to contravene the statute. Id.
132. HWTC, 861 F.2d at 270. For further discussion of the court's holding in
HWFC that EPA was not to consider stigmatic consequences, see supra notes 39-58
and accompanying text.
133. Thomas Wolfe, RealisticRecyding, 37 FED. B. NEWS &J.90 (1990) (stating
that if used oil were listed as hazardous waste, legislators feared few would handle
waste because of accompanying burdens of treatment, disposal and storage regulations). See RODGERS, supra note 27 (noting economic arguments raised by those
against treating used oil as hazardous waste contending listing would be accompanied by Superfund liabilities which would discourage recycling activities).
134. See Beiring, supra note 2, at 174 (discussing EPA's decision not to list
used oil asjustified on grounds that listing used oil would discourage recycling and
cause increase in uncontrolled dumping). See also, NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1066
(Agency's decision rested upon assertion that listing used oil would discourage
recycling); Russiello, supranote 1, at 177 (listing used oil as hazardous waste would
lead to uncontrolled dumping).
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By inference, the incentive for businesses cannot be obtained
without a detrimental effect on the environment. The adverse impact used oil has on the environment is significant. Since mismanaged used oil can migrate by land, air and sea, its impact will be felt
throughout our ecosystem.' 3 5 Previous compilations of records reporting over eighty major mismanagement incidents contaminating
the ground or drinking water with lead illustrate the potentially
threatening impact used oil can have on the environment. 3 6 Additionally, the toxic constituents contained in oil are capable of migrating into hazardous concentrations which can lead to further
pollution of water, soil, crops, and damage plant and animal life if
mismanaged.' 3 7 Human lives can also be seriously impacted by the
toxic constituents present in used oil, causing liver and kidney damage, reproductive disorders, dysfunctions to the nervous system,
38
heart failure and stillbirths.1
The failure to strictly enforce the treatment of used oil could
result in a careless waste of a limited resource. 139 A major source of
United States petroleum used for lubricating oil is already being
seriously depleted. 140 EPA estimates that by 1997, 230 million gal135. Beiring, supra note 2, at 161, states the following:
Oil and its contaminants can seep into soils, migrate into groundwater,
and runoff into surface waters. Improper burning of used oil can result
in oil entrained in airborne dust particles, and emissions containing high
concentrations of heavy-metals. Burning of used oil mixed with other
hazardous wastes often creates products of incomplete combustion which
can be carcinogenic." Id. See also Identification and Listing of Hazardous
Waste, 56 Fed. Reg. 48,034 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 261,
266).
136. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1075 (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 49,267). The cost to clean up
these sites ranges from $10,000 to $5,150,000 per site. Id. See also U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Listing Waste Oil As a Hazardous Waste: Report to Congress (joint appendix) 103 (1981) (describing the possibility of ground water
becoming non-potable due to contamination by used oil).
137. NRDC, 25 F.3d at 1077. See also, RODGERS, supra note 27 (discussing welldocumented reports of potential of used oils to pollute drinking water). Further,
the evacuation of Times Beach and Love Canal exemplify toxic disasters which
could potentially result from the mismanagment of used oil. ROGERS, supra note
27.
138. Beiring, supra note 2, at 164 (quoting Legislative Commission on Toxic
Substances and Hazardous Wastes, Used-But Useful: A Review of the Used Oil
Management Program in New York State 13 (1986)). See also U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Listing Waste Oil as a Hazardous Waste: Report to Congress
(1981) (reporting potential threats used oil poses to human health and
environment).
139. See Beiring, supra note 2, at 158; Recycling of Used Oil: HearingBefore the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980).
140. See infra note 142. See also Beiring, supra note 2, at 158.
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Ions of used oil will be generated annually from households. 4 1
With regulations setting forth the proper management of used oil,
the oil could be cleansed properly and used again, lengthening the
life of this resource.
The purpose of used oil programs "[are] to protect the environment from spills and improper disposal, to conserve energy,
and to preserve petroleum resources. This requires efforts to prevent illegal dumping, isolate used oil from other wastes for recycling, and ensure that collected oil is properly handled."' 4 2 If
used oil were listed, regulations could emphasize lower safety regulations and require recyclers to follow specific cleansing procedures.1 43 It remains to be seen which federal regulations will apply
to suits regarding the mismanagement of used oil. The numerous
regulations involving environmental procedures could provide a
loophole for careless mismanagers to slip through. 44 It will ultimately be up to EPA in its future actions to ensure the proper management of used oil.
Susan M. Kanapinski
141. Meske, supra note 3, at 370 n.80 (citing Sarah Carney, An Overview of
Used Oil Recycling Issues, Address at the Fourth National Conference on Household Hazardous Waste Management (Nov. 6-8, 1989), U.S. EPA, Proceedings of
the Fourth National Conference on Household Hazardous Waste Management, 4,
103 (1989)).
142. Beiring, supra note 2, at 169 (quoting Michael L. Courtright, Used Oil:
Don't Dump It, Reycle 1, MAcHiNE DESIGN, Oct. 25, 1990, at 82).
143. Rusiello, supranote 1, at 181-82 (discussing why used oil should be listed
under RCRA as hazardous).
144. See HWTC, 861 F.2d at 271 (court discussing maze of statutes involving
hazardous wastes it must muddle through in deciding the case before it). See generally R. Zener, GUIDE TO FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW xv (1981) (stating that
"there has been a proliferation of new Federal environmental statutes.... Each
new federal environmental statute contains a maze of detailed and complex provisions, which the EPA has sought to implement through voluminous regulations");
Yang, supranote 5, at 1368 ("EPA's statutory framework is among the most complicated in the federal government.").
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